北京市y担保公司全面风险管理体系研究工商管理专业论文.docxVIP

堕都经济贸易大学硕士学位论文 堕都经济贸易大学硕士学位论文 北京市Y担保公司全面风险管理体系研究 Abstract At present，small and medium-sized enterprise(SMES)grow rapidly in our country,the position and role of SMES in the national economy and social development is growing stronger day by day．However,the financing difficulties of SMES also become a phenomenon which has attracted many attentions of the society．Financing Guarantee agencies is regarded as one of the effective methods to crack this problem．However,compared诚tll bank direct loan client．the customers， quality of financing guarantee agencies is sub optimal，coupled with the information asymmetry between the customers and the guarantee agencies．Once the SMES break off the engagement，the guarantee agency must be fully repaid those secured debt with its own funds，the risk of Financing Guarantee agencies is very high．Enterprise Risk Management(EI洲)Can help Guarantee agencies promote risk management level． Information Asymmetry of SMESGuarantee agencies and financial institutions， shifting risk constitutes the external risk source of Guarantee agencies，the Principal-Agent relationship，imperfect internal control system，not fully implemented intemal control system，the project managers’moral hazard and adverse selection constitutes the internal risk source．nle intemal and external risk formation mechanism lead to four basic principles in the construction of ERM：widen the channel of the collecting SMES information to reduce information asymmetry,and to take risks together with financial institutions，improve the internal control system of Guarantee agencies l，to supervise the system performing effectively．Taking Y guarantee company’S ERM as an example，using the above theory to analysis，finally to propose an ERM improvement program for Y guarantee company from the point of EI洲．As Y guarantee company is still in its initial phase．the system is not perfect and personnel is not enough．Besides，the issues of ERM that Y guarantee compan