博弈论 （GAME THEORY）LECTURE 1课件.pptVIP

* Example: The battle of the sexes Opera is Player 1’s best response to Player 2’s strategy Opera Opera is Player 2’s best response to Player 1’s strategy Opera Hence, (Opera, Opera) is a Nash equilibrium Fight is Player 1’s best response to Player 2’s strategy Fight Fight is Player 2’s best response to Player 1’s strategy Fight Hence, (Fight, Fight) is a Nash equilibrium 2 , 1 0 , 0 0 , 0 1 , 2 Chris Pat Prize Fight Opera Prize Fight Opera * Example: The battle of the sexes Coordination games Multiple equilibria Focal point a la Thomas Schelling Culture Some other salient features * Example: Matching pennies Head is Player 1’s best response to Player 2’s strategy Tail Tail is Player 2’s best response to Player 1’s strategy Tail Tail is Player 1’s best response to Player 2’s strategy Head Head is Player 2’s best response to Player 1’s strategy Head Hence, NO pure strategy Nash equilibrium -1 , 1 1 , -1 1 , -1 -1 , 1 Player 1 Player 2 Tail Head Tail Head * Definition: best response function Player i’s best response Given the strategies chosen by other players * Definition: best response function Player i’s best response to other players’ strategies is an optimal solution to * Using best response function to define Nash equilibrium A set of strategies, one for each player, such that each player’s strategy is best for her, given that all other players are playing their strategies, or A stable situation that no player would like to deviate if others stick to it * Cournot model of duopoly A product is produced by only two firms: firm 1 and firm 2. The quantities are denoted by q1 and q2, respectively. Each firm chooses the quantity without knowing the other firm has chosen. The market priced is P(Q)=a-Q, where a is a constant number and Q=q1+q2. The cost to firm i of producing quantity qi is Ci(qi)=cqi. * Cournot model of duopoly The normal-form representation: Set of players: { Firm 1, Firm 2} Sets of strategies: S1=[0, +∞), S2=[0, +∞) Payoff functions