商业银行信贷风险缓释机制研究基于抵押贷款和担保贷款的比较视角.docxVIP

商业银行信贷风险缓释机制研究一一基 于抵押贷款和担保贷款的比较视角 中国人民银行济宁市中心支行 摘要： 本文从抵押贷款与担保贷款的比较视角，分析了两种贷款模式在风险缓释机制 上的差异，并运用山东省某城市商业银行中小微企业客户的信贷数据信息进行 实证分析，结果显示:与抵押贷款相比，担保贷款中的逆向选择问题更为严重， 在银行可观测到借款人的信用风险条件下，借款人的信用风险越高，银行越倾 向于采用担保贷款或追加担保数量来缓释风险;实际上的担保链条并非企业自发 形成的信用合作，而多是“政府Z手”或银行介入等外部力量搭线“拉郎配” 的结果，导致担保合约安排偏离最优状态;而长期稳定的银企关系可以实现信息 不对称的消减，降低担保要求，是当前打破中小企业担保怪圈的一个可行路径。 关键词： 风险缓释;信用担保;银企关系;逆向选择; 作者简介：张勇，供职于屮国人民银行济宁市屮心支行。 收稿日期:2017-08-24 A Study on the Mechanism of Credit Risk Mitigation in Commercial Banks A Comparative Perspective Based on Mortgage and Guaranteed Loans Zhang Yong PBC Jining Sub-branch: Abstract： This paper analyzes the difference between the two loan models in risk mitigation mechanism from the perspective of mortgage and guaranteed loans, and makes an empirical analysis of the credit data of smal1 and medium enterprises in a commercial bank of Shandong Province- The results show that the reverse selection in guaranteed loan is more serious than that of mortgage. Provided that the bank could observe the borrower s cred it risk, if the credit risk of the borrower is higher, the bank will be more possible to adopt the guaranteed loan or additional guarantees to mitigate the risk. In fact, the guarantee chain is not a spontaneous formation of credit coopcration, but mostly the accomplishment of ^governmental handz，, bank intervention and other external forces wiretapping, resulting that the guaranteed contract arrangements have deviated from the optimal state. However, a long-term bank-enterprise relati on ship can reduce information eisymme try and guara ntee requirements, which is a viable access to break the vicious circle of small and medium enterprise guarantee. Keyword： risk mitigati on; cred it guara ntee; ban k-e nterprise relati on ship; adverse sclcction; Received： 2017-08-24 信息不对称造成的道德风险和逆向选择，是银行在信贷市场上面临的主要问题。 为缓解信息不对称，银行往往会要求抵押资产，而可抵押财产匮乏的背景下， 企业通常会寻求第三方担保，即信用担保，由此形成的互保合作、联保合作已成 为缓解屮小企业融资难的重要手段。信用担保具有一定的信息甄别和筛选功能， 有助于减轻道徳风险和逆向选择问题。然而，近年来，担保圈、担保链问题频发， 具有较强的风险传染性和蔓延性，呈现岀区域集聚性和