会计盈馀之监督与评价角色关联性之研究：台湾实证结果.pdf

風險管理學報 第六卷 第二期 2 0 0 4 年 7 月 Journal of Risk Management Vol.6 No.2 July 2004 pp.119-154 會計盈餘之監督與評價角色關聯性之研究：台 灣實證結果* The Relation between the Stewardship and Valuation Roles of Accounting Earnings: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan 蔡柳卿(Liu-Ching Tsai)** 楊朝旭(Chaur-Shiuh Young)*** 摘 要 過去研究已發現，會計盈餘在決定股價及監督評估管理者績效上均扮演重要角色 （分別稱為盈餘的評價與監督角色）。本研究旨在以國內上市公司之資料，探討「公司價 值－盈餘敏感性」與「總經理薪酬－盈餘敏感性」間的關係，亦即盈餘的評價與監督角 色是否具有關聯性。實證結果發現，在控制其它因素後，公司價值－盈餘敏感性與總經 理薪酬－盈餘敏感性呈顯著的正向關係。表示我國董事會平均而言，在設計總經理薪酬 計畫時，會依據當期盈餘時效性來決定盈餘之薪酬權數，俾促使總經理決定當期努力水 準時，將其本期行動對公司價值全部影響的折現值皆考慮在內。 關鍵詞：總經理薪酬、價值－盈餘敏感性、薪酬－盈餘敏感性。 Abstract Previous studies have shown that accounting earnings play an informational role both in determining stock prices (valuation role) and in evaluating and compensating top corporate executive performance (stewardship role). The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between the valuation and stewardship roles of accounting earnings, using Taiwanese listed firms as the sample. Since the capitalization rate of earnings into value also influences the marginal product of current period actions, we expect that value-earnings sensitivities (VES) and compensation-earnings sensitivities (CES) are positive correlated. The empirical evidence demonstrates that there actually exists a positive link between VES and CES after controlling for other agency-based determinants of CES. This result implies that the Board of Taiwanese listed firms, as the Board of firms in the United States, may try to mitigate managers’ myopic decision behavior by taking the timeliness of current earnings into consideration i