毕业设计-基于群选择理论的二元博弈行为探究.docVIP

- PAGE I - 本科毕业设计 （20 届） 基于群选择理论的二元博弈行为探究 所在学院 专业班级 物理学 学生姓名 学号 指导教师 职称 完成日期 年 月 PAGE \* MERGEFORMAT I 【摘要】本文基于博弈论中群选择理论构建了一个考虑两个层次的异质性竞争条件的随机演化模型，研究了该模型中合作行为的涌现，同时探寻了该模型中合作行为涌现的微观机理。将一个封闭系统中的N个个体随机分配到m个子群体中，个体可随机选择合作与背叛策略，同时考虑子群体从总体收益中划分一个随机比例（）为子群体的公共收益，子群体中所有个体依据公共品博弈收益矩阵分配剩余收益，并依据个体的收益值比例在整个系统中竞争繁衍，而各子群体在子群体间的竞争力依赖于各自的公共收益。当一个子群体在整个系统竞争中取得繁衍的权利时，公共收益最小的子群体将从系统中剔除。本文系统分析了合作演化的动力学行为，发现当群体中合作者数量大于临界值时，群体i将倾向合作。同时本文从理论角度论证了子群体策略集中必然存在一个演化稳定策略，因此个体策略的演化与群体策略演化之间有着复杂的动力学关联，两者共同促进了系统合作行为的演化发展，同时两者的影响效果受子群体竞争强度的影响。 【关键词】群选择；异质性；公共收益；涨落。 Abstract 【ABSTRACT】 we estable a two-level heterogeneity into account competitive conditions of the stochastic evolution model 。In the model we considered the cooperative behavior of the model. A system contain N individual is subdivided into groups. Evry group have a different and it is used to detrmine the distrbution of public revenue and individual income. Group interact with others in an evolution game that determines their public revenue.When a group split into two sub-groups the group who`s public revenue is minimum will be eliminated. And individuals reproduce with a probability linear correlate with individual income.In our model we derive a fundamental condition : if the number of parterner is greater than a threshold number ,this group will tend to co-operation. From the theoretical point of view policy focus on sub-groups demonstrated an evolutionary stable strategy must exist. Therefore, the evolution of individual strategies and population policies have complex dynamics of correlation. while both The the effect of the two levels controlled by the intensity of competition. 【KEYWORDS】Group selection; heterogeneity; public revenue; fluctuations. 目　录 TOC \o 1-3 \h \z \u HYPERLINK \l _Toc292703844 1 背景介绍 PAGEREF _Toc292703844 \h 1 HYPERLINK \l _Toc292703845 1.1 研究背景 PAGEREF _Toc292703845 \h 1 HYPER