机构投资者持股对高管薪酬激励的影响会计学专业论文.docxVIP

Ab Abstract PAGE PAGE III Abstract Today，institutional investors have occupied half of the securities market, they are the power rising briskly in the past 20 years, it’s impact on the corporate governance has caused strong concern of the academic and practical circles. Then what kind of impact can the institutional investors exert on the classic problem in the on corporate governance — — manager control problem? To the very sensitive current issues — — executive compensationy, what is the role of institutional investors can play? Based on research samples of the Shenzhen and Shanghai two stock markets in 2007-2011 A-share listed companies that has the institutional investor shareholding ,author carry on empirical research. After the regression test on the overall data, based on the basic situation of listed companies in China will grouping samples according to the actual controller type and region contrast research. Research found that: the institutional investor shareholding and executive compensation of listed company level and executive compensation performance sensitivity were significantly positive correlation; Compared with the state-owned listed companies, institutional investors for non-state-owned listed companies level of executive compensation and executive compensation performance sensitivity effect is bigger; Relative to the less developed areas of listed companies, institutional investors of listed companies in developed areas level of executive compensation and executive compensation performance sensitivity of influence is greater. The first chapter is for the introduction. This chapter elaborated this article research background, research significance, research content and innovation points, related concepts defined and listed paper outline. The second chapter is literature review. This chapter reviews the related literature in this field at home and abroad. The third chapter is theoretical analysis. This chapter firstly summarizes the princ