文翻译--金融公司破产及系统性的风险.docVIP

外文原文 Financial ?rm bankruptcy and systemic risk In Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG), themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remained with the insurer. Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIG’s credit default swaps (CDSs). The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIG’s assets, with no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue to function as before. Thus, the government’s effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that ?rms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result. The concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-vis CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008. In contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related ?rms. This decision is consistent with the view in macroeconomic research that financial?rmbankruptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies. For example, Bordo and Haubrich (2009) conclude that “...more severe ?nancial events are associated withmore severe recessions...” Likewise, Bernanke (1983) argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in the banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious balance sheets and tighter credit conditions. This in turn leads to a drop in investment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn. Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at non?nancial ?rms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not