博弈论9-2.-Cheap-Talk-与直接显示机制.pptxVIP

Cheap Talk“以上信息仅供参考”嗨！留神张醒洲，大连空谈博弈张醒洲，大连概念例 分析设计概念：Cheap Talk vs. Signaling一种面向特定对象、直接的、低成本的交流无约束力（无法查证，无义务）观点的（口头）交流。Cheap Talk 可以影响他人的观点/看法，以至于行动；言论、观点，交流手段与过程是低成本的，它们不直接影响参与交流的主体的收益；空谈有别于信号（发送与接受）张醒洲，大连例张醒洲，大连中央银行的政策表态 vs 公开市场业务表态会起作用，但不能精确计算；习惯性提示“嗨！小心汽车”；免责申明，道义劝告？“以上信息仅供参考”“股市有风险，入市需谨慎！”网络评论与留言跟帖…… one more, please!Cheap Talk :why, how张醒洲，大连ISSUES分析特定环境中 空谈博弈的效果；如何设计一个环境，以便发挥空谈博弈的优势；在某些机制下，自利的立法者之间的争论，可以提高法案的社会价值；？网络 辩论……工会可以提高社会福利，因为工会可以提高工人与管理层之间的沟通 空谈如何起作用？张醒洲，大连信号博弈所有类型的信号发送者对接收者可能的行动有相同的偏好所有工人都希望高工资，无论其能力高低发现发送者偏好的一致性会影响空谈的作用条件（必要性）空谈者偏好不同；接收者对不同类型发送者采取不同的反应 Cheap Talk Game: timing张醒洲，大连Cheap Talk Game: Paymentinformation: message vs. signal 张醒洲，大连The key feature of such a cheap-talk game is that the message has no direct effect on either the Senders or the Receivers payoff.The only way the message can matter is through its information content: by changing the Receivers belief about the Sender‘s type, a message can change the Receivers action, and thus indirectly affect both players payoffs. Cheap Talk Game: message space 张醒洲，大连Since the same information can be communicated in different languages, different message spaces can achieve the same results. The spirit of cheap talk is that anything can be said, but formalizing this would require M to be a very large set. Instead, we assume that M is (just) rich enough to say what needs to be said; that is, M=T.perfect Bayesian equilibrium张醒洲，大连Because the simplest cheap-talk and signaling games have the same timing, the definitions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the two games are identical as well: {messaging strategy, action strategy，belief about the type of the speaker}， 4 conditionsperfect Bayesian equilibrium: Pooling, Separating 张醒洲，大连One difference between signaling and cheap-talk games, however, is that in the latter a pooling equilibrium always exists.Because messages have no direct effect on the Sender‘s payoff, if the Receiver will ignore all messages then pooling is a best response for the Sender