网络信息安全内容整理.ppt

* 现代密码学理论与实践-13 */47 若A为B签署m，0= m = p-1， A随机选择k∈[0, p-1]，gcd(k, p-1) = 1 计算r =αk mod p 计算αm = YArrs mod p, YA=αxA mod p 即αm =αxA rαk s mod p 则 m = (xAr + ks) mod p-1 根据此式求s，则对于m的数字签名即为(r, s)， 0≤ r, sp-1. ElGamal的数字签名方法 * 现代密码学理论与实践-13 */47 验证：给定m, r, 和s，容易计算 αm mod p = YArrs mod p, 看其是否一致, k不能重复使用。 （p287） 例：p = 17, α = 3, xA= 2, xB= 5, m = 11, k = 5, 求签名及验证。 ElGamal数字签名的验证 * 现代密码学理论与实践-13 */47 验证：给定m, r, 和s，容易计算 αm mod p = YArrs mod p, 看其是否一致, k不能重复使用。 例：p = 17, α = 3, xA= 2, xB= 5, m = 11, k = 5, 求签名及验证。 签名：r = αk mod p = 35 mod 17 = 5, 11 = (2x5 + 5s) mod 16 = (10 + 5s) mod 16 5s mod 16 = 1, s = 13. 所以，签名为(5, 13)。 验证: αm mod p = 311 mod 17 = 102x10x9 mod 17 = 7 YArrs mod p = (32)5 x 513 mod 17 = 7 ElGamal数字签名的验证 * 现代密码学理论与实践-14 */40 网络信息安全Chapter 14 Authentication Applications * 现代密码学理论与实践-14 */40 ①IDC, IDtgs, TS1 ②EKC[KC,tgs, IDtgs, TS2, Lifetime1, Tickettgs] Tickettgs = EKtgs[KC,tgs,IDC, ADC, IDtgs, TS2, Lifetime2] ③IDV, Tickettgs, AuthenticatorC (用户身份证明文件) AuthenticatorC = Ekc,tgs[IDC, ADC, TS3] ④Ekc,tgs[KC,V,IDV, TS4, TicketV] TicketV = Ekv[KC,V,IDC, ADC, IDV, TS4, Lifetime4] ⑤TicketV, AuthenticatorC AuthenticatorC = Ekc,v[IDC, ADC, TS5] ⑥Ekc,v[TS5+1] 认证会话交互过程的信息细节 ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ 中央识别服务器 AS 通行票产生服务器TGS 用户C 服务器V 网络信息安全内容整理. 谢谢 * Expand on definition and use of “security attack”, as detailed above. See Stallings Table 1.1 for definitions of threat and attack. * The simplest form of multiple encryption has two encryption stages and two keys - Double-DES. Have concern that there might be a single key that is equivalent to using 2 keys as above, not likely but only finally proved in 1992. More seriously have the “meet-in-the-middle” attack, first described by Diffie in 1977. It is a known plaintext attack (ie have know pair (P,C), and attempts to find by trial-and-error a value X in the “middle” of the double-DES encryption of this pair, and chances of this are much better at O(2^56) th