财务会计理论—Game Theory2.ppt

There are communication in each game interaction and thus * Revelation principle (Myerson 1979): For any contract under which the manager has incentive to lie about his/her private information, an equivalent contract can be designed that motivates truth-telling. Arya, Glover Sunder (RAS: 1998): as a practical matter, it is unlikely that the revelation principle can eliminate earnings management The RP looks at isolated situation: the owner must be able to commit that the truth will not be used against the manager in the future (if it is used in the future, the truth telling contract will be more costly) There must be no restrictions on the form of contract (e.g. do slavery allowed?) No restrictions on the manager’s ability to communicate his/her information (there may be legal liability / loss of reputation etc to the truth-telling party) * Assumption: You may trust Monty Door that during the process he will not switch either the goat or the money. What’s the probability of winning if you do not switch = 1/3. Now if you switch. Assume that you always start by picking Door #1, then after you pick Door #1, the host will open another door (either door #2 or #3), and you will then switch to the remaining door (either #2 or #3) then losing If the money is behind Door #2, then after you pick Door#1 the host will be forced to open Door #3, then you will then switch to Door #2 then winning. If the money is behind Door #3, then after you pick Door #1 the host will be forced to open Door#2, and you will then switch to Door #3 then winning. Hence in 2 of the 3 (equally likely) cases, you will win. Thus the probabilities of winning by switching is 2/3 * Game Theory: An Analysis of conflictA Short Introduction Chapter 9 Scott * Game Theory von Neuman Morgenstein (1944): The Theory of Games Economic Behavior Interaction of 2 or more players Asymmetric information and uncertainty the action chosen by one player depend on what action that the player thinks