投资者保护与公司股权结构：一个家族企业继任模型.docVIP

PAGE PAGE 15 投资者保护与公司股权结构：一个家族企业继任模型 摘要：本文借鉴家族企业继任模型，研究了投资者保护对公司股权结构安排产生影响的作用机理，认为投资者保护程度是决定公司股权结构安排的重要因素，公司治理结构中最优股权结构模式的选择在一定程度上受投资者保护的法律体系健全与否的影响。 关键词：投资者保护、股权结构、公司治理 Investor Protection and Corporate Equity Ownership Structure: A Model of Succession in Family Firms ABSTRACT By citing a model of succession in family firms, this paper investigates the mechanism through which investor protection affects corporate equity ownership structure. It reveals that investor protection level is a key factor in shaping corporate equity ownership structure; and that the legal system of investor protection is healthy or not is the principal constraint on the optimal model choice of equity ownership structure. Key Words： Investor protection、Equity Ownership Structure、Corporate Governance 一、引言 公司股权结构安排在各国间差异很大。在Berle和Means型公司（1932）[1] Berle, A., JR., and G., Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property [1] Berle, A., JR., and G., Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M]. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1932. 经济学家从各种角度试图对这种差异进行解释，其中一种值得注意的思路是研究投资者保护水平对公司股权结构的影响。就公司的经营绩效方面看，通常情况下股权集中的家族管理模式要劣于股权分散的职业管理模式（越来越多的实证结果证实了这一点，如Morck等，2000[2] Morck, R., B. Yeung, and W. Yu, The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,58: 215-260.）。但是，公司采取所有权与管理权的两权分离形式，又会引发代理问题：即不管由谁来经营企业，他都有掠夺股东权益的动机。由此， [2] Morck, R., B. Yeung, and W. Yu, The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,58: 215-260. LaPorta、Lopez－de－Silanes、Shleifer和Vishny（简称LLSV，1998[3] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Sheifer, and R. W. Vishny, Law and Finance[J], Journal of Political Economy, 1998,106: 1113-55. ，1999[4] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Sheifer, and R. W. Vishny, Corporate Ownership around the World[J], Journal of Finance, 1999,54 [3] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Sheifer, and