lesson1-研究生英语阅读教程(提高级_第三版)原文及翻译.docVIP

Spillonomics: Underestimating Risk 漏油经济：低估风险 David Leonhardt Published: June 1, 2010 [1] In retrospect, the pattern seems clear. Years before the Deepwater Horizon [h??ra?zn] rig [r?ɡ] blew, BP was developing a reputation as an oil company that took safety risks to save money. An explosion at a Texas [?t?ks?s] refinery [r??fa?n?ri] killed 15 workers in 2005, and federal regulators and a panel led by James A. Baker III, the former secretary of state, said that cost cutting was partly to blame. The next year, a corroded [k??r??d] pipeline in Alaska poured oil into Prudhoe Bay, upbraided [?p?bre?d] BP managers for their “seeming indifference to safety and environmental issues. [??ju:z]” [1] 回想起来，模式似乎很清楚。早在“深水地平线”钻机自爆前的很多年，BP石油公司为了省钱甘冒安全的风险就已经声名狼藉。2005年得克萨斯州炼油厂爆炸中有15名工人丧生。联邦监管机构和前国务卿詹姆斯·贝克三世领导的专门小组认为，削减成本是事故的部分原因。第二年，阿拉斯加腐蚀的管道将石油漏入普拉德霍湾。就连乔·巴顿，对全球变暖持怀疑态度的来自得克萨斯州的共和党众议员，都谴责BP管理人员“对安全和环境问题表现得漠不关心” [2] Much of this indifference stemmed from an obsession with profits, come what may. But there also appears to have been another factor, one more universally human, at work. The people running BP did a dreadful [?dr?df?l] job of estimating the true chances of events that seemed unlikely—but that would bring enormous costs. [2]这种冷漠大部分源于对利润的过度追求，不管出现什么情况。但似乎也还有另一个因素在起作用，一个更普遍的人性的因素。BP的管理人员在估计似乎不太可能发生但一旦发生就会带来巨大损失的事件真正会发生的可能性时，犯了一个可怕的错误。 [3] Perhaps the easiest way to see this is to consider what BP executives [?g?zekj?t?v] must be thinking today. Surely, given the expense of the clean-up and the hit to BP’s reputation, the executives wish they could go back and spend the extra money to make Deepwater Horizon safer. That they did not suggests that they figured the rig would be fine as it was. [3]也许理解这一点最简单的方法就是思考一下BP高管们如今的想法。显然，考虑到清理费用和对BP声誉的影响，高管们真希望可以回到过去，多花些钱让“深水地平线”更安全。他们没有增加这笔费用就表明他们认为钻机在当时的状态下不会出问题。 [4] For all the criticism BP executives may deserve, they are far from the only people to struggle with such low-probability, high-cost events. Nearly everyone does. “These are pr