DisruptiveGenius
Innovation guru Clayton Christensen on spreading his gospel, the
Gospel,and how to winwiththe electric car
by Craig Lambert
July-August 2014
WHEN HE WAS 34 years old, Clayton Christensen started a company with a
few MIT professors called Ceramics Process Systems Corporation.“Iwasthe
business guy,” he explains. “We were making new products out of advanced
materials.Inthatmarketniche,weweretheonlyonestosucceed:we
beat DuPont,Alcoa, Hoechst.I could not explain thisby our having smarter
people. The other companies had smart owners and smart managers, too.
How could smart people fail? I started to think about other
industries where talented leaders had failed—were they actually
stupidmanagers?”
Living in the Boston area, Christensen, M.B.A. ’79, D.B.A. ’92, now Clark
professor ofbusiness administration,had enjoyed a close-up view of the rise
and fall of Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), a minicomputer
manufacturer. DEC ranked among the world’s most widely admired
companies in the 1970s and 1980s, and was, after state government, the
second-largestemployerinMassachusetts.Minicomputersweremuchsmaller
thanmainframes,whichhadappearedinthe 1950s,yet muchlargerthanthe
personaldesktopcomputersthatfollowedthem,beginningintheearly 1980s.
Inthe1970s,minisruledmuchofcomputation.
But by the late 1980s, the business desktop microcomputer was eating DEC
alive.“PeopleattributedDEC’sdemiseto[CEOKen]Olsen,”Christensensays.
(Olsen had regarded desktop computers as toys for playing video
games and publicly predicted they would fall flat in the business
market.) “But the ‘stupid manager’ hypothesis didn’t make sense,
because every company that made minicomputers, every one of
them,diedinunison!Itwasn’tjustDigital,butDataGeneral,Prime,Wang,
Honeywell.Youmight expectthesecompaniestocollude (密谋) on
priceoccasionally,buttocolludetocollapseisastretch.”
Christensenbecamecuriousaboutwhatdroveanentirecategoryofbusinesses
to crash together in a s
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