财务会计理论（第6版）威廉·R·斯科特-scott_6e_PPT_ch10b.pptVIP

Copyright ? 2012 Pearson Canada Inc 10S - * Financial Accounting TheorySixth EditionWilliam R. Scott Supplement to Chapter 10 Wolfson (1985) Study of Oil and Gas Limited Partnerships 10S - * 10.2 Empirical Evidence of Incentive Problems and Their Mitigation in Oil and Gas Tax Shelter Programs Mark A. Wolfson (1985) An application of agency theory 10S - * The Question to Be Addressed In a multi-period context, can market forces (i.e., reputation effects) eliminate shirking? If so, no need to motivate managers by means of incentive contracts 10S - * Tax-Advantaged Limited Partnerships to Drill for Oil and Gas (U.S.) Principal: the limited partner (s), who invest and receive advantageous tax treatment Agent: the general partner/manager Conducts drilling, and on basis of drilling results decides whether or not to complete the well 10S - * Two Types of Drilling Exploratory Riskiest (low probability of high payoff) Developmental Least risky (high probability of low payoff) 10S - * An Incentive Contract A common sharing rule (contract) Tangible drilling costs: must be capitalized for tax purposes Intangible drilling costs: immediately tax deductible Agent (manager) pays tangible costs Principal (limited partner, investor) pays intangible costs Let revenue from well be R Manager gets, e.g., .40R Investor gets .60R 10S - * Information Asymmetry Manager knows expected R, investor does not This leads to incentive problems of moral hazard and possible shirking by manager Noncompletion problem (manager shirks by not completing well) 10S - * The Noncompletion Problem (Well Is Drilled but not yet Completed) A model of revenue from well: E(R) = K(D + C) D: drilling costs. Paid by investor C: completion costs. To be paid by manager K: manager’s skill (e.g., K = 2) Manager generates $2 in revenue for each dollar spent Manager knows E(R) and C, investor does not Continued 10S - * The Noncompletion Problem (continued) From standpoint of society (and investor) Complete