人工智能道德主体地位研究的两种进路.pdfVIP

科技创新与应用 2023年10期 Technology Innovation and Application 研究视界 D0I： 10.19981/j.CN23-1581/G3.2023.10.022 人工智能道德主体地位研究的两种进路 李佳辉 （河北经贸大学,石家庄050061） 摘要:人工智能道德责任归属问题的核心环节是分析人工智能是否具有道德主体地位 。单纯从客观外在原因入手分析难以 完整涵盖人工智能的研究框架，需辅以主观原因相互补充，逐渐形成人工智能道德主体地位研究的 “内在进路”和 “外在进路” 。“内 在进路”以人类自身对人工智能的特殊情感态度为出发点，探究人工智能伦理爭议的始点因素， “外在进路”则聚焦算法设计赋予人 工智能按照内在程序运行的自主行动能力 。2种研究进路将焦点对准 “人工智能是否真的具有道德主体地位”这一问题背后的相关 理论分析，把视线重新拉回到人工智能背后真正的实践主体 ，有助于完善相关伦理准则及政策法规的制定。 关键词：人工智能；道德主体地位；内在进路；外在进路;伦理 中图分类号:TP18 文献标志码:A 文章编号：2095-2945 (2023 )10-0087-05 Abstract: The core link of the attribution of moral responsibility of artificial intelligence is to analyze whether artificial intelligence has the status of moral subject. Starting with the analysis of objective external reasons, it is difficult to fully cover the research framework of artificial intelligence, which needs to be supplemented by subjective reasons to gradually form the internal approach and external approach of the study of the moral subject status of artificial intelligence. The internal approach takes the special emotional attitude of human beings towards artificial intelligence as the starting point to explore the starting point of the ethical dispute of artificial intelligence, while the external approach focuses on the algorithm design that gives artificial intelligence the ability to act independently according to the internal program. The two research approaches focus on the relevant theoretical analysis behind the question of whether artificial intelligence really has the status of moral subject, and draw the attention back to the real practical subject behind artificial intelligence, thereby are helpful to improve the formulation of relevant