新兴市场领域，股权结构与公司价值的关系外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 原文 Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets Material Source：/finkvl/LinsJFQA2003.pdf Author: Karl V. Lins Abstract This paper investigates whether management stock ownerahip and large non-managemcot blockholder share owneiship are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging maikets. When a management groups control l i g ^ exceed its cash flaw tights, I find that finn values are lower. I also find that large non-management control limits blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these e￡fects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection. One interpretation of these results is that extemal shareholder protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that laige non-management blockholders can act as a paitial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanistns. I. Introduction Recent research shows that large blockholders dominate the ownership structures of firms not domiciled in the U.S. or a few other developed countries (Shleifernd and Vishny (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV)(1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and Denis and McConnell (2003)). This research suggests that such concentrated ownership coincides with a lack of investor protection because owners who are not protected from controllers will seek to protect themselves by becoming controllers. When control has incremental value beyond any cash flow rights associated with equity ownership, shareholders will seek to obtain control rights that exceed cash flow rights in a given firm. Around the world, control in excess of proportional ownership is usually achieved through pyramid structures in which one firm is controlled by another firm, which may itself be controlled by some other entity. The management group (and its family members) is usually the largest blockholder of a firm at th