专利许可和市场结构对化工产业的影响外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 原文 Patents, Licensing, And Market Structure In The Chemistry Industry Material Source: 1/econ-wp/io/papers/9605/9605003.pdf Author: Ashish Arora The German strategy of using patents to build walls around entire research areas was particularly successful when they had a substantial lead over their rivals. But over time, some firms, such as ICI, and Du Pont managed to reduce the gap, at times helped by their national governments, leading to the formation of a number of international cartels. The chemical industry was probably one of the earliest global industries and cartels, both domestic and international, were an important aspect of this globalization. In fact, the pre-WW II international chemical market has been characterized by many as a sort of a gentlemens club (e.g. Spitz [1988], Smith [1992].) While some cartels, such as the alkali cartel, were purely about market sharing, others were organized around a common technology, and were often initiated by the patent holder. The latter would license the technology, often in exchange for a small financial stake. For instance, Solvay required that the licensees of his ammonia-soda process share any improvements with him, and in turn, these were shared with other licensees. This helped the Solvay retain control, as well as enable his process to remain competitive against rivals (Haber [1958: 89], Hounshell [1992]). Although cartels had explicit market sharing rules, economic theory suggests that licensing agreements alone could have achieved many of the restrictive outcomes that the inter-firm agreements specified. Using a simple theoretical model of Cournot oligopoly in the product market, one can show that a patent holder can design a licensing contract offered to all existing producers that replicates the monopoly outcome (see Katz and Shapiro [1986] for details.) These cartels used a number of instruments, including patent licensing agreements, to maintain market shares and deter