Tsai_ APSR_2007_ 连带群体、非正式责任和公共品供给.pdfVIP

American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2 May 2007 DOI: 10.1017.S000座机电话号码70153 Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China LILY L. TSAI Massachusetts Institute of Technology hy would government of?cials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal demo- cratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than Wthe minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local of?cials can be subject to unof?cial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal. ormal institutions of accountability are often tal performance and variation in governmental public weak in developing countries Bardhan 2002 . goods provision have focused primarily on the role of FStates in these countries often lack strong bu- strong democratic and bureaucratic institutions. The- reaucratic institutions for controlling corruption and ories of institutional design argue that the key to making sure that lower level of?cials are doing their good government is providing formal democratic in- jobs. Democratic institutions such as elections that al- stitutions and devolving power to local levels so that low citizens to hold local of?cials accountable may citizens can monitor and sanction of?cials effectively be weak and unreliable or even nonexistent. Yet in e.g., Dahl 1971; O’Donnell 1996; Rose-Ackerman these countries som