August 20, 2002.ppt

August 20, 2002 DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Dow Security Vulnerability Assessment Overview April, 2005 Outline Dow Background of the SVA process Overview of Dow SVA process steps Review the type of recommendations that are generated by Dow SVAs. Expectations about Dow site vulnerability Key issues identified during Implementation General General items, Public and Private Responsibilities of companies SVA Background  After the 9/11/2001 attack on the WTC: Focus of US authorities on Process Industry Draft legislation (elimination of highly toxic materials, additional layers of protection) ACC proposal: Assessment first Mandatory in US Additional requirements will depend uponoutcome SVA Process Steps Screening of all manufacturing sites into 4 tiers based upon perceived consequences of an attack Used to prioritize the assessment work Established standard scope for SVAs undesired release of a hazardous (flammable or toxic) chemical with significant off-site consequences caused by either a potential outside (Terrorist or extremist) or an inside (disgruntled employee) adversary. Planning Gather data from site process plants, local law enforcement and site leadership Preliminary scenario consequence severity threat level used to identify high priority attack scenarios SVA Process Steps Perform Site Visit ESS audit – evaluates existing perimeter security and meets Security portion of EHS Audits SVA using Sandia Methodology confirms high priority scenarios (~ 2 hours per process plant) Interviews of site employees from process plants ESS Provide implementation support to site personnel Analysis of Findings Recommendations Consensus development of recommendations by SVA team Includes consideration for removal or reduction of the hazardous material as well as mitigation to deter, detect or delay an adversary. Impact of the recommendations is documented SVA Process Steps Final Report Communications SVA report written and agreed upon by site busines