肖作平债务期限结构.pdfVIP

公司治理影响债务期限水平吗？ ——来自中国上市公司的经验证据∗ 肖作平 廖理 （西南交通大学经济管理学院，四川 成都 610031 ；清华大学经济管理学院，北京 100084） 摘要：本文结合中国制度背景，理论推演公司治理与债务期限水平之间关系。接着，采用中 国非金融上市公司面板数据，应用混合最小二乘法实证检验公司治理如何影响债务期限水平，采 用参数和非参数检验程序实证检验法律制度对债务期限水平的影响。研究发现，公司治理确实影 响债务期限水平。实证结果支持了这样的论点——当公司治理水平高时，内部人（管理者/控制股 东）受到更严格的监督，更少的管理者壕沟效应，控股股东的机会主义行为受到限制，公司将使 用更少的短期债务。这些结果表明公司治理与短期债务的使用之间存在替代效应。 关键词：公司治理 债务期限 面板数据 混合最小二乘 参数和非参数检验 Does Corporate Governance Affect Debt Maturity Level? :Empirical Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies XIAO Zuo-ping LIAO Li （School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, ChengDu 610031,China； School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China） Abstract: Combining Chinese institutional background, the paper theoretically deduces how corporate governance affects debt maturity level. Then, the paper examines empirically how corporate governance influences debt maturity level by adopting pooled least squares and panel data of Chinese non-financial listed companies, and examines empirically the effect of legal institution on debt maturity level by adopting parametric and non-parametric test procedure. The study finds that corporate governance does affect debt maturity level. The empirical results support the view that corporate governance is high, insider(control shareholder/management) is subjected to strictly supervised, entrenchment effect is small, the control shareholder’s opportunism is curbed, and the company will use less short-term debt. These results show that there is a substitutive effect between corporate governance and the use of short-term debt. Keywords: Corporate governance; Debt maturity; Panel data; Pooled least squares; Parametric and non-parametric test 联系地址：西南交通大学经济管理学院，邮编：610