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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Author(s): Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy
Source: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 225-264
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: /stable/2937665
Accessed: 15/10/2009 14:02
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Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives
Michael C. Jensen
Harvard University
KevinJ. Murphy
Universityof Rochester
Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, op-
tions, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indi-
cate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in
shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated
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