- 1、本文档共37页,可阅读全部内容。
- 2、原创力文档(book118)网站文档一经付费(服务费),不意味着购买了该文档的版权,仅供个人/单位学习、研究之用,不得用于商业用途,未经授权,严禁复制、发行、汇编、翻译或者网络传播等,侵权必究。
- 3、本站所有内容均由合作方或网友上传,本站不对文档的完整性、权威性及其观点立场正确性做任何保证或承诺!文档内容仅供研究参考,付费前请自行鉴别。如您付费,意味着您自己接受本站规则且自行承担风险,本站不退款、不进行额外附加服务;查看《如何避免下载的几个坑》。如果您已付费下载过本站文档,您可以点击 这里二次下载。
- 4、如文档侵犯商业秘密、侵犯著作权、侵犯人身权等,请点击“版权申诉”(推荐),也可以打举报电话:400-050-0827(电话支持时间:9:00-18:30)。
查看更多
Chapter 14 Imperfect Competition Imperfect Competition Pricing in these markets falls between perfect competition and monopoly. Three topics considered: Pricing of homogeneous goods in markets with few firms. Product differentiation in these markets. How entry and exit affect long-run outcomes in imperfectly competitive markets. Pricing of Homogeneous Goods Market where a relatively few firms produce a single homogeneous good. Assume demanders are price takers. Assume there are no transactions or informational costs. These assumptions result in a single equilibrium price for the good. Initially, assume a fixed, small number of identical firms. Competitive Outcome In Figure 14-1, the equilibrium of the Bertrand game occurs at point C. This equilibrium also corresponds to the perfectly competitive outcome. FIGURE 14-1: Pricing under Imperfect Competition Perfect Cartel Outcome A model of pricing in which firms coordinate their decisions to act as a multiplant monopoly is the cartel model. Assuming marginal costs are constant and equal across firms, the cartel output is point M (the monopoly output) in Figure 14-1. The plan would require a certain output by each firm and how to share the monopoly profits. FIGURE 14-1: Pricing under Imperfect Competition The Cournot Model The Cournot model of duopoly is one in which each firm assumes the other firm;s output will not change if it changes its own output level. Assume A single owner of a costless spring. A market demand curve for water has the equation Q = 120 - P. Nash Equilibrium in the Cournot Model For a pair of quantities, qA and qB, to be a Nash equilibrium, qA must be a best response to qB and vice versa. A’s total revenue equals: A’s marginal revenue equals FIGURE 14-2: Cournot Best-Response Functions Nash Equilibrium in the Cournot Model Equating marginal revenue with the marginal cost of 0, and solving for qA gives A’s best-response function B’s best-response function would then be Nash Equilibrium in the C
您可能关注的文档
- 云计算基础教程 程克非 罗江华 兰文富 Part One新.ppt
- 云计算基础教程 程克非 罗江华 兰文富 Part Three新.ppt
- 云计算基础教程 程克非 罗江华 兰文富 Part Two新.ppt
- 云计算与大数据技术 王鹏 黄焱 安俊秀 张逸琴 第2章-云计算与大数据的相关技术(楷体) 新.ppt
- 云计算与大数据技术 王鹏 黄焱 安俊秀 张逸琴 第2章-云计算与大数据的相关技术(微软雅黑) 新.ppt
- 云计算与大数据技术 王鹏 黄焱 安俊秀 张逸琴 第3章-虚拟化技术 新.ppt
- 云计算与大数据技术 王鹏 黄焱 安俊秀 张逸琴 第6章-Hadoop—分布式大数据系统新.ppt
- 云计算与大数据技术 王鹏 黄焱 安俊秀 张逸琴 第8章-Storm—基于拓扑的流数据实时计算系统新.ppt
- 云计算与大数据技术 王鹏 黄焱 安俊秀 张逸琴 第9章-服务器与数据中心 新.ppt
- 中级财务管理 课件 戴书松 1_ 项目评估-(第八讲)新.ppt
文档评论(0)