激励相容的输配分开电力市场竞价机制初探.pdfVIP

30 卷 8 期 电 网 技 术 Vol. 30 No. 8 2006 年4 月 Power System Technology Apr. 2006 文章编号：1000-3673 （2006 ）08-0060-05 中图分类号：TM743 文献标识码：A 学科代码：790 625 激励相容的输配分开电力市场竞价机制初探 俊， 陈星莺 （河海大学电气工程学院，江苏省 南京市 210098 ） A Preliminary Study on Incentive Compatible Bidding Mechanism for Electricity Market with Separated Power Transmission and Distribution XIE Jun ，CHEN Xing-ying Electrical Engineering Institute, Hohai University，Nanji ng 210098 ，Jiangsu Province，China ） ABSTRACT: To make the power generation companies, 指出，将具有激励相容特性的Vickrey 拍卖机制应 power distribution companies and large customers announce 用于发电竞价机制设计可能具有潜在的优势。文献 the real operational parameter in day-ahead market, on the [5-7]研究了具有激励相容特性的发电市场竞价机 basis of mechanism design theory a mathematical model of 制设计问题，其中文献[6]的仿真结果表明其所提出 incentive compatible bidding mechanism for electricity market 的竞价机制能够较好地解决输电阻塞问题，文献[7] with separated power transmission and distribution is 则考虑了对发电公司固定成本的合理回收问题。文 constructed, and the incentive compatibility feature of the 献[8]针对发电成本的非凸特性和电能效用的非凹 constructed model is proved. Taking an electricity market involving five generation companies, three distribution 特性研究了包括需求侧投标的电力市场激励相容 companies and three large customers for example, the basic 竞价机制设计问题，但该模型的解有时并不唯一。 features of the proposed bidding mechanism are illustrated by 竞价交易理论是电力市场研究领域的重要组 Monte Carlo simulation. 成部分，