Prisoners Dilemma Supergame on Rectangle Lattice.pdfVIP

Open Journal of Applied Sciences, 2013, 3, 7-11 doi:10.4236/ojapps.2013.31B1002 Published Online April 2013 (/journal/ojapps) Prisoners Dilemma Supergame on Rectangle Lattice Zhongxing Ye1,2, Jingshu Chen3 1School of Business Information Management, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade, Shanghai, China 2Department of Mathematics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China 3Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, USA Email: yezx@, jingshuc@ Received 2013 ABSTRACT In this paper a class of large supergames, i.e., infinitely repeated games played by many players are studied. The players located on the vertex set of planar rectangle lattice play several basic games with his neighbors. The basic game is two-person prisoners’ dilemma game with asymmetric payoffs. Under the conditions of the pre-specified updating rules and the transition probabilities, the relevant stochastic process of strategy evolution forms a Markovian process. The simulation results about the long-run behavior are provided. Keywords: Prisoners’ Dilemma; Supergame; Planar Rectangle Lattice; Markov Process; Invariant Measure; Equilibrium 1. Introduction pursue the limiting behavior of the dynamics. Section 4 is the conclusion, in which some further research direc- In a series of our previous works we have investigated a tions are mentioned. class of large Ising-type supergames, i.e., infinitely re- peated games