Bus Rapid Transit in Latin America - nexus.umn.edu.pptVIP

Remaining Issues Traditional model still functions, as a competing mode Old buses to be scrapped, but owners replace them Current fares may not be sustainable with expansion Diminishing returns with each new route Cannot rise much higher than traditional system Discussion Would the political system in U.S. metro areas be any more conducive to the success of BRT? Source: NBRTI (Cain, et al.) List of Actors: National government – initiated transit reform Transantiago – agency created to administer new system Metro agency – administration of existing rail line Private bus companies Passengers Timeline Pre-1979 – Buses regulated by state agency 1980-83 – Complete privatization and deregulation 1991 – Reregulation of fleet size, age and emissions 1998 – Failed negotiations allow fares to rise 2000 – Ricardo Lagos becomes president, transit reform begins 2005 – New buses and operating companies introduced 2006 – Michelle Bachelet becomes president 2007 – Complete system switch on February 10 2007 – Bachelet announces changes March 10 Planning Existing service similar to Bogotá’s traditional model Excessive amounts of routes and buses, poor condition of buses, high accident rates Private firms could profit by providing such low-quality service Should firms be allowed to profit from public service? Should they have to reinvest their earnings to improve the system? Planning Transantiago included: Bus system reorganization Extension of existing Metro rail line Integration of all city transit into one system Similar BRT system to Bogotá and Curitiba Trunk/feeder route structure Segregated bus lanes on trunk routes Central, electronic fare collection system Interagency conflict Metro was more popular, so funds were directed to rail Opposition from bus companies System map Source: www.transantiago.cl Implementation New companies took over routes in 2005 February 10, 2007 – “Big Bang” before completion Bus lane, station construction not complete Not enough buses were a