Byzantine fault tolerance - Systems@NYU.pptVIP

Byzantine fault tolerance Jinyang Li With PBFT slides from Liskov What we’ve learnt so far:tolerate fail-stop failures Traditional RSM tolerates benign failures Node crashes Network partitions A RSM w/ 2f+1 replicas can tolerate f simultaneous crashes Byzantine faults Nodes fail arbitrarily Failed node performs incorrect computation Failed nodes collude Causes: attacks, software/hardware errors Examples: Client asks bank to deposit $100, a Byzantine bank server substracts $100 instead. Client asks file system to store f1=“aaa”. A Byzantine server returns f1=“bbb” to clients. Strawman defense Clients sign inputs. Clients verify computation based on signed inputs. Example: C stores signed file f1=“aaa” with server. C verifies that returned f1 is signed correctly. Problems: Byzantine node can return stale/correct computation E.g. Client stores signed f1=“aaa” and later stores signed f1=“bbb”, a Byzantine node can always return f1=“aaa”. Inefficient: clients have to perform computations! PBFT ideas PBFT, “Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance”, M. Castro and B. Liskov, SOSP 1999 Replicate service across many nodes Assumption: only a small fraction of nodes are Byzantine Rely on a super-majority of votes to decide on correct computation. PBFT property: tolerates =f failures using a RSM with 3f+1 replicas Why doesn’t traditional RSM work with Byzantine nodes? Cannot rely on the primary to assign seqno Malicious primary can assign the same seqno to different requests! Cannot use Paxos for view change Paxos uses a majority accept-quorum to tolerate f benign faults out of 2f+1 nodes Does the intersection of two quorums always contain one honest node? Bad node tells different things to different quorums! E.g. tell N1 accept=val1 and tell N2 accept=val2 Paxos under Byzantine faults Paxos under Byzantine faults Paxos under Byzantine faults Paxos under Byzantine faults PBFT main ideas Static configuration (same 3f+1 nodes) To deal with malicious primary Use a 3-phase protoc