Constant Round Oblivious strongTransferstrong in the Bounded-Storage Model.pptVIP

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2016-03-12 发布于广东
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Constant Round Oblivious strongTransferstrong in the Bounded-Storage Model.ppt

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Constant Round Oblivious strongTransferstrong in the Bounded-Storage Model.ppt

On Everlasting Security in the Hybrid Bounded Storage Model Danny Harnik Moni Naor Talk Overview The Bounded Storage Model and everlasting security. The Hybrid Bounded Storage Model Negative results for encryption Positive results for encryption The Bounded Storage Model Alternative cryptographic setting: “Mainstream Cryptography”: Assume parties are time bounded (run in polynomial time). This model: Assume parties have bounded storage. Bounded Storage Model - the setting [Maurer 92] A long random string R is transmitted. Honest parties store small portions of R. Adversary allowed to store almost all of R. Random string is no longer available. Bound is only at end of transmit stage. Shared Key Encryption Parties meet in advance and share a (short) secret key k. When R is transmitted Alice and Bob store Sk, a small portion of R, determined by k. Adversary does not know k and with overwhelming probability does not store all of Sk. Use Sk to encrypt the message. Shared Key Encryption - Properties Abundance of work on this setting: [Mau92,CM97,AR99,ADR02,DR02,DM02,Lu02, Vad03]. State of the art requires low storage from Alice and Bob: |Sk| = log r + log 1/ε + m |k| = log r + log 1/ε Everlasting security [ADR]: Security guaranteed even if at a later stage the adversary learns the key k or gains more memory. Security does not require any computational assumptions. What if Alice Bob don’t meet in advance??? Public Key Encryption in the BSM [CM97] show a method of constructing a Key Agreement protocol in the BSM. Local storage requirements for Alice and Bob are very high. Require r?+δ storage space. Can one do better? No, the solution is tight as shown by a lower bound of [DM04]. Need to change the model… The Hybrid BSM Idea: use a computational Key Agreement protocol to agree on the shared key k E.g. run the Diffie-Helman KA protocol. Then use a standard shared key BSM scheme with everlasting security. Even if the eavesdropper breaks the KA protocol