Dissent Accountable Anonymous Group Messaging.pptVIP

Major Themes in Prior Work General-purpose anonymous-communication mechanisms MIX networks and Onion Routing (OR) Dining-Cryptographers networks (DC-nets) Special-purpose mechanisms, e.g.: Anonymous voting Anonymous authentication, e.g., group or ring signatures E-cash Basic Operation of Onion Routing Client picks a few (e.g., three) anonymizing relaysfrom a cloud of available relays. He then builds and uses an onion of cryptographic tunnels through the relays to his communication partner. Properties of Onion Routing Key advantages: Scalable to large groups of clients and relays Can be made interactive (e.g., Tor) Widely deployed (e.g., Tor) Key disadvantages: Many vulnerabilities to traffic analysis No accountability: Anonymous disruptors can Spam or DoS-attack relays or innocent nodes Compromise other users’ anonymity [Borisov et al. ’07] Dining Cryptographers (DC-nets) Information-theoretic group anonymity Ex. 1: “Alice+Bob” sends a 1-bit secret to Charlie. Dining Cryptographers (DC-nets) Information-theoretic group anonymity Ex. 2: Homogeneous 3-member anonymity group Properties of DC-nets Schemes Key advantages: Provable, information-theoretic anonymity Resistence to traffic analysis and collusion Key disadvantages: Not easy to scale up or implement efficiently Not widely deployed No accountability: Anonymous disruptors can Spam or DoS-attack the group without discovery Force group reformation without being eliminated Starting Point: Verifiable, Anonymous Shuffling[Brickell and Shmatikov ’06] N parties with equal-length messages m1 , …, mN send mπ(1) , …, mπ(N) to a data collector. The protocol provably provides Integrity: {m1 , …, mN} = {mπ(1) , …, mπ(N)} Anonymity: π is random and not known by anyone. Resistance to traffic analysis and collusion Dissent v.1 adds accountability and the ability to handle variable-length messages efficiently. Dissent, version 1: Overview Assumptions: Equal-length messages Each group m