中财微观经济学第十一章有市场势力的定价说课.ppt

本章概要 攫取消费者剩余 1.假设：厂商具有定价的垄断势力 2.定义：价格歧视Price Discrimination 3.分析框架 4.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination 完全一级价格歧视的含义 First-Degree PriceDiscrimination in Practice 4.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination 二级价格歧视导致的消费者剩余向利润转化（与完全竞争时相比） 一级价格歧视与二级价格歧视的区别 4.3 Third-Degree Price Discrimination 如果边际成本上升很快，可能不向较小的市场销售 4.4 Intertemporal Price Discrimination 4.5 The Two-Part Tariff 4.6 广告 有关广告投入的最优化 （d）What would EA’s profit be for each flight? Would she stay in business? Calculate the consumer surplus of each consumer group. What is the total consumer surplus? 解： = (90)(250) + (110)(375) –{41,000 + (90 + 110)(100)} =63,750 - 61,000 = $2,750. Consumer surplus for Type A travelers is (0.5)(650 - 375)(110) = $15,125. Consumer surplus for Type B travelers is (0.5)(400 - 250)(90) = $6,750 Total consumer surplus is $21,875. （e）Before EA started price discriminating, how much consumer surplus was the Type A demand getting from air travel to Honolulu? Type B? Why did total surplus decline with price discrimination, even though the total quantity sold was unchanged? 解： When price was $300： Type A travelers demanded 140 seats; consumer surplus was (0.5)(650 - 300)(140) = $24,500. Type B travelers demanded 60 seats at P = $300; consumer surplus was (0.5)(400 - 300)(60) = $3,000. Consumer surplus was therefore $27,500, which is greater than consumer surplus of $21,875 with price discrimination. EA to extract consumer surplus from those passengers who value the travel most. * 第十一章 有市场势力的定价 如何利用垄断势力将消费者剩余转化为利润 假设：具有定价的垄断势力 无垄断势力 定义：价格歧视 分析框架： 结论：存在最优定价策略使消费者剩余全部转化为厂商利润 经验研究 有垄断势力 一、二、三级价格歧视 跨期价格歧视/高峰价格 两部收费制度 广告 P* MR D P Q MC Q* P*-MC 定义：出于利润最大化目的，对不同的顾客或者同一货物的不同数量或者不同的时间制定不同的价格 Losses Q P D = AR MR P* Q* AC MC 实施价格策略，只要△ ▽，就可以扭亏为盈 P* Q* Without price discrimination, output is Q* and price is P*. Variable profit is the area between the MC MR (yellow). Q P With perfect discrimination, firm will choose to produce Q** increasing variable profits to include purple area. Co