On-The-Fly Verification of Rateless Erasure Codes.ppt

IEEE Security Privacy On-The-Fly Verification of Rateless Erasure Codes Max Krohn (MIT CSAIL) Michael Freedman and David Mazières (NYU) On-The-Fly Verification of Rateless Erasure Codes Max Krohn (MIT CSAIL) Michael Freedman and David Mazières (NYU) The Setting A large file F Linux ISO (650MB) H(F) is available signed by Publisher (RedHat) A handful of untrusted sources/mirrors S1,…S8 A Handful of Senders The Setting A large file F Linux ISO (650MB) H(F) is available signed by Publisher (RedHat) A handful of untrusted sources S1,…S8 Their aggregate BW is limited A slew of receivers R1,...,R1,000,000 Version 81.3 just released! Want it Now! Three Desirable Properties Receivers Get Fast, Verifiable Downloads The trusted publisher (RedHat) Splits up F into n blocks Hashes all blocks Signs all hashes (or hash tree) Receivers: Download and verify hashes Download needed file blocks in parallel Everyone for Themselves Everyone For Themselves Verifiable Multicast (BitTorrent) Verifiable Multicast (BitTorrent) Multicast With Erasure Codes Sources erasure encode the file F Multicast With Erasure Codes Sources erasure encode the file F Receivers collect blocks and decode Multicast With Erasure Codes Multicast With Erasure Codes Bullet [SOSP 2003] SplitStream [SOSP 2003] Big Downloads [IPTPS 2003] Informed Content Delivery [SIGCOMM 2002] Receivers Cannot Verify Content Receivers Cannot Verify Content Multicast With Erasure Codes Multicast With Erasure Codes What is the Attack Goal? To corrupt the file. To waste bandwidth. How To Attack? Properties of a Solution to Pollution OK: Receivers can tell good from bad. Much better: Receivers can finger bad blocks as they arrive. Outline Introduction Review of LT Codes Strawman #1 Strawman #2 Efficiently Catching Bad Blocks as They Arrive LT-Codes [Luby, FOCS 2002] LT-Codes – How To Encode LT-Codes – How To Encode (cont’d) How To Decode How To Decode How To Decode How To Decode How To Decode How To Decode How To Decode How To Dec