第17章 GMarket with Asymmetric Information.ppt

2 of 35 ? 2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing ? Microeconomics ? Robert S. Pindyck, 8e. Chapter 17: Markets with Asymmetric Information * of 28 Copyright ? 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall ? Microeconomics ? Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Fernando Yvonn Quijano Prepared by: Markets with Asymmetric Information 17 C H A P T E R Copyright ? 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall ? Microeconomics ? Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. CHAPTER 17 OUTLINE 17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons 17.2 Market Signaling 17.3 Moral Hazard 17.4 The Principal–Agent Problem 17.5 Managerial Incentives in an Integrated Firm 17.6 Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage Theory QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS 17.1 ● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess different information about a transaction. The Market for Used Cars The Market for Used Cars Figure 17.1 When sellers of products have better information about product quality than buyers, a “lemons problem” may arise in which low-quality goods drive out high quality goods. In (a) the demand curve for high-quality cars is DH. However, as buyers lower their expectations about the average quality of cars on the market, their perceived demand shifts to DM. QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS 17.1 The Market for Used Cars The Market for Used Cars (continued) Figure 17.1 Likewise, in (b) the perceived demand curve for low-quality cars shifts from DL to DM. As a result, the quantity of high-quality cars sold falls from 50,000 to 25,000, and the quantity of low-quality cars sold increases from 50,000 to 75,000. Eventually, only low quality cars are sold. ● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess different information about a transaction. QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS 17.1 The Market for Used Cars The lemons problem: With asymmetric information, low-quality goods c