浙大宁波理工学院语平台第五学期5.docVIP

During the next half-century, most wealthy societies—the United States is a conspicuous exception—will lose population; all will have older populations. This is a collective change that will profoundly influence the world economy, the future of democracy and relations between nations with declining populations(generally richer countries) and those with expanding populations (generally poorer countries). Just how large the effect might be is anyone’s guess. But the driving forces behind ageing and population decline, low birthrates and longer life expectancy—seem fairly fixed. Only the United States—with higher birthrates and immigration—escapes population decline. But even in the United States, there are fewer potential workers for each potential retiree. As long as retirees are supported by taxpayers, through Social Security and health insurance, the economic burden on workers will rise. In most countries, the shifts would be stark and possibly unworkable. Germany’s working age population is projected to drop from 51million in 2000 to29 million in2050; meanwhile the 65 and over population rises from 14 million to 21 million. Although these precise predictions may prove wrong, the central truth is that “the natural growth of population in the more developed countries has essentially ceased.” Americans may have succeeded better in mixing family and work. Or immigrants may have more children than other Americans. Regardless, all rich nations will feel the pressure of the ageing—or declining populations. And there’s perverse possibility that more old people will further reduce the number of young people. If taxes on workers increase to cover higher retirement benefits, families’ willingness to have children may diminish, because it would be harder to pay for them. Immigration is one possible safety valve. But for Europe and Japan, the increases needed to avert population declines would be huge. Richer countries could also prepare for their ageing by investing in po