企业的策略性行为-Websterinchina.ppt

The trend of market structure P311 P313 2 1 Panel A – Game tree Roll-back solution boy 1 Football 2 2 Ballet girl girl Football Football Ballet Ballet 0 0 0 0 1 2 First-Mover Second-Mover Advantages First-mover advantage If letting rivals know what you are doing by going first in a sequential decision increases your payoff Second-mover advantage If reacting to a decision already made by a rival increases your payoff Determine whether the order of decision making can be confer an advantage Apply roll-back method to game trees for each possible sequence of decisions Motorola’s technology Analog Digital Sony’s technology Analog A $10, $13.75 B $8, $9 Digital C $9.50, $11 D $11.875, $11.25 First-Mover Advantage in Technology Choice Panel A – Simultaneous technology decision S S M M Panel B – Motorola secures a first-mover advantage First-Mover Advantage in Technology Choice Example: product choice Strategic Moves Commitments Actions used to put rivals at a disadvantage Three types Commitments Threats Promises Only credible strategic moves matter Managers announce or demonstrate to rivals that they will bind themselves to take a particular action or make a specific decision No matter what action is taken by rivals Example：commitments 8000，3000 1000，1000 Big engine 3000， 0 3000，6000 Small engine Engine firm oversize vehicle light-duty vehicle Automobile firm Engine firm’s decision 8000，3000 1000，1000 Big engine 0， 0 0， 0 Small engine Engine firm oversize vehicle light-duty vehicle Automobile firm Entry game 4，0 3，-1 Low price (price war) 10，0 5，1 High price (accept) Incumbent Don’t enter Enter New enter 4，0 3，-1 Low price (price war) 7，0 2，1 High price (accept) Incumbent Don’t enter Enter New enter Threats Promises Conditional statements Threats Explicit or tacit “If you take action A, I will take action B, which is undesirable or costly to you.” Promises “If you take action A, I will take action B, which is desirable or rew