第8章 合谋.pptVIP

第8章　合谋 教师：史先诚 产业经济学系 南京大学经济学院 sxc@nju.edu.cn,2008年2－6月 Three Types of Collusion Explicit Conspiracy. Cartel; Secret agreement: Price fixing agreement Per se illegal Tacit Coordination. Facilitating Practices. 8.1　重复博弈和合谋的稳定性 The Bertrand Model: Duopoly. Without collusion, p1*= p2*= c and thus ?i = 0 . Industry quantity is set at the perfectly competitive level. For a monopolist, price is set where MR = MC: P = a-bQ, so MR = a -2bQ. And set c = a-2bQ QM = (a-c)/2b and PM = (a+c)/2 So ?M = (PM - c)*QM = (a+c - 2c)/2 * (a-c)/2b = (a-c)2/4b If each firm produces 1/2 QM, each gets (a-c)2/8b When Are Trigger Strategies are NE? To check if there is a symmetric equilibrium with trigger strategies: Make sure that cooperating is better than defecting if other player has cooperated. Make sure that “punishment” is a credible threat, that you will actually go through with it. 自选择的激励相容 企业1的预期利润现值 偏离合谋的利润 不偏离的条件： 若r为利息率： 若企业改变价格的频率为f: 若行业存在的可能性为h: 若行业增长率为g: Why doesnt everyone collude? Illegal. In the US, collusive agreements cannot be enforced by legal contracts International cartels do exist, however. 合谋不易达成。贴现率变化 欺骗动机导致合谋不稳定。不能及时准确侦测。惩罚不是动态均衡。 8.2　价格战 合谋与价格战并存的均衡现实 个别企业偏离合谋，降价与需求波动之间难以区分，偶尔价格战是建立合谋的约束机制。预测了顺周期价格波动 需求随机波动，当前需求带来的利润诱惑增加，因此为维护合谋可能出现反周期价格波动 不对称冲击：个别陷入财务危机的企业发动价格战。也可能是强势企业为抢占市场份额而发动价格战 8.3　促成合谋的因素 市场结构： 集中度高，少数几个寡头 企业规模比较对称，成本结构类似 不对称的多市场联系 企业或政府制定的规则： 最惠消费者条款 交易价格公开性 Facilitating Practices “Most Favored Customer” clauses or price matching policies. Reduces sellers’ incentives to cut prices. Long-term customer contracts or exit fees. Insulates sellers from new competition. Advance announcement of price changes. Facilitating Practices, con’t May have positive benefits along with anti-competitive effects. Not necessarily illegal. Evaluated under a “rule-of-reason”. Compare benefits to harm -- only illegal if there is a net harm. Factors that Affect the Success of Collusion Ability to get “monopoly profits” in collusive phase. Elasticity of deman