AReputationSchemeCombiningTrustandIncentiveforP2P.pptVIP

A Reputation Scheme Combining Trust and Incentive for P2P File Sharing Mao Yang，Qinyuan Feng，Yafei Dai，Zheng Zhang Peking University, Beijing, China Microsoft Research Asia, Beijing, China ICDCS2007，Toronto，Canada Outline Motivations The problem Proposal for a solution An experiment to understand some features of the solution Conclusions The “basics” of P2P file sharing system “Axiom 1”: a p2p file sharing system is in a healthy state if it has enough number of users and the number does not decrease. in a macro view “Axiom 2”: the only reason for an individual being a p2p user is to get what he wants easily. People tend to be free riders for public goods. After all, “free riding” is a fundamental phenomena in human society (Olson, Mancur 1966, The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge University Press ) The “basics” of P2P file sharing system “Law 1”: a volunteer-based p2p system is in a healthy state if it has enough good resources that can be easily accessed A: availability (quantity of quality resources) B: accessibility (high bandwidth, easy to find, not confusing, not frustrating) “Law 2”: a volunteer-based p2p system being in a healthy state is not because we have eliminated free-riders and colluders, etc. But，… Selfish users free-riders: download a lot, upload a little (purposely or not), negative to A Whitewashers, colluders: try to take advantage of incentive policy in a p2p system without actual contribution, negative to both A and B. “Malicious” users Intentionally upload fake files, negative to B To take advantage of traffic-based incentive policy To pollute the resource environment, so that innocent users get frustrated. Two general measures to keep users Incentives (awards) ? improve A provide some kind of reward for contributions such as points in Maze, TFT in BT and eMule Trust ? improve B Knowing the trustworthy of users or files, user has more confidence about what he is getting such as EigenTrust A duality formulation of award and trust A