Foundations of PrivacyLecture 4.pptVIP

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* Give the handouts (course web page) Maybe I am wrong on how I parsed this, I am not sure More about exponential mechanism Emphasize DB is always poly-size No need to repeat their theorem Need though to have SMALL UNIVERSE conclusion in the title Foundations of Privacy Lecture 4 Lecturer: Moni Naor Recap of last week’s lecture Differential Privacy Sensitivity: Global sensitivity of query q:Un→Rd GSq = maxD,D’ ||q(D) – q(D’)||1 Local sensitivity of query q at point D LSq(D)= maxD’ |q(D) – q(D’)| Smooth sensitivity Sf*(X)= maxY {LSf(Y)e-? dist(x,y) } Histograms Differential privacy of median Exponential Mechanism Histograms Inputs x1, x2, ..., xn in domain U Domain U partitioned into d disjoint bins S1,…,Sd q(x1, x2, ..., xn) = (n1, n2, ..., nd) where nj = #{i : xi in j-th bin} Can view as d queries: qi counts # spoints in set Si For adjacent D,D’, only one answer can change - it can change by 1 Global sensitivity of answer vector is 1 Sufficient to add Lap(1/ε) noise to each query, still get ε-privacy The Exponential Mechanism [McSherry Talwar] A general mechanism that yields Differential privacy May yield utility/approximation Is defined and evaluated by considering all possible answers The definition does not yield an efficient way of evaluating it Application/original motivation: Approximate truthfulness of auctions Collusion resistance Compatibility Side bar: Digital Goods Auction Some product with 0 cost of production n individuals with valuation v1, v2, … vn Auctioneer wants to maximize profit Example of the Exponential Mechanism Data: xi = website visited by student i today Range: Y = {website names} For each name y, let q(y, X) = #{i : xi = y} Goal: output the most frequently visited site Procedure: Given X, Output website y with probability prop to e?q(y,X) Popular sites exponentially more likely than rare ones Website scores don’t change too quickly Size of subset Setting For input D 2 Un want to find r2R Base measure ? on R - usu

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