EYE DISEASE AND DEVELOPMENT DCISM眼部疾病和发展DCISM.pptVIP

Udfyld sidefod-oplysninger her Udfyld sidefod-oplysninger her Comments on: “The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics” Carl-Johan DalgaardDIIS , June 7, 2011 Full disclosure: I don’t work in the field of macro that Katarina is criticizing I do share with Katarina a concern with this branch of macro But its no fun if I agree … A couple of things worth bearing in mind at the outset The financial sector has a socially useful role to play: intermediate between savers and investors Fascilitates the growth process (entry/exit of firms) That’s why growth theorists have been preoccupied with it for decades  This process does not always work smoothly: Financial crisis has happened repeatedly in the past: Great Depression, Japan late 1980s/1990s, Sweden 1991, Asian Financial Crisis 1997 (Reinhart/Rogoff; Kindleberger and many others) Average outcomes from Financial Crisis. Source: Reinhart Rogoff, 2008. The aftermath of Financial Crisis. But as of early 2000s the ”mainstream” model (e.g., Woodford, 2003) of BC (Basically the AD/AS model, Benigno, 2009 ) did not reserve any particular role for financial intermediaries … why? The classical account of the GD: Friedman/Schwartz. Collapse of money supply (lower money multiplier), leading to lower economic activity and deflation Hence, the perception was the such crisis could be resolved by decisive action of the FED (plus deposit insurance). The source of the crisis in Asia did not seem to be relevant to economies like the US. FC’s have been studied, and lessons have found their way into textbook models (especially Great Depression) … So what’s ”new”? One critical factor: The rise of the ”shadow banking sector”. Banks and financial service companies were gradually allowed to integrate Why? Until 1980s commercial banks (in US) were not allowed to pay interest on demand deposits Large depositors demanded alternatives; inflation in the 1970s important motivator By 1990s business