BIICLondonNovember.pptVIP

BIIC London, 16 November 2007 The new EU merger remedies policy Dr Johannes Luebking Deputy Head of Unit, Directorate C-5, DG Competition The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission nor those of DG COMP Reasons and objectives of review Reflect conclusions from Commission抯 Merger Remedies Study (2005) http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/studies_reports/remedies_study.pdf Incorporate recent jurisprudence Important guidance in EDP/GDP, GE, Tetra, Cementbouw and easyjet judgements Reflect experience gained in recent Commission practice Relevant recent remedies cases such as Inco/Falconbridge or GDF/Suez Update with regard to changes introduced in 2004 Merger Review Mainly concerns options to extend deadlines to discuss and assess remedies Planned adoption of the new texts early 2008 General Principles Allocation of responsibilities (EDP/GDP/ENI, GE/Honeywell) Commission informs the parties of the competition concerns identified It is for the parties to propose remedies, Commission cannot unilaterally impose conditions Commission has to assess the effects of the operation, as modified by the remedies Commission has eventually to prove that remedies are not sufficient to remove competition concerns Proportionality (Cementbouw) Parties do not need to submit remedies that go further than what is necessary to remove competition concerns If they do so, however, Commission cannot reject them and impose different ones General Principles Assessment standard (GE/Honeywell, easyjet) Commitments have to eliminate competition concerns entirely and to be comprehensive and effective from all points of view Certainty as to the implementation Probability as to the assessment of the operation (搈ore likely than not that the operation modified significantly impedes effective competition? Appropriateness of different types of remedies Divestitures generally preferred, including for non-hori