On Concealed Data Aggregation for WSNs无线传感器网络的隐蔽数据聚集.pptVIP

IHP Im Technologiepark 25 15236 Frankfurt (Oder) Germany ? 2007 - All rights reserved IHPIm Technologiepark 2515236 Frankfurt (Oder)Germany IHP Im Technologiepark 25 15236 Frankfurt (Oder) Germany ? 2007 - All rights reserved On Concealed Data Aggregation for Wireless Sensor Networks Steffen Peter Peter Langend?rfer, Krzysztof Piotrowski Outline Concealed Data Aggregation? What does it mean? What is it for? Privacy homomorphism Example for an efficient CDA scheme CaMyTs-Algorithm Discussion of security properties Awareness to passive and active attacks Solution to overcome security problems Cascaded privacy homomorphism Conclusions Scenario: WSN as movement/intruder detection Q: Sensed something since last request? In-Network-Aggregation (INA) 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1,0 1,0 0,0 1,0 1,0,1,0 1,0,0,0 1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0 ? 3 Without INA: ? Reduced packet traffic Security Issues of in-network aggregation Without cryptography No security Classic End-to-End security (DES, AES, ECC) Encryption on sensor – decryption on sink + Very secure - No possibility of in-network aggregation Hop-by-Hop encryption Packets are encrypted and decrypted on every routing node + In-network aggregation possible - No End-to-End security every routing node knows and can change every plaintext Concealed (In-netwok) Data Aggregation We need: End-to-End security that allows aggregation on routing nodes = Routing nodes do not know what they aggregate = Ability to compute with encrypted values Only sink node can decrypt the aggregated value Solution:Privacy Homomorphism Encryption Value1 Encryption Value2 Encryption Value1 + Value2 CaMyTs (Castelluccia, Mykletun, Tsudik) Random Stream: 15 22 6 Random Stream: 30 9 11 Random Stream: 27 2 29 Value: 1 Value: 0 Value: 1 Encryption: 1+15=16 (mod 32) Aggregation: 16+30+28 =74 =10 (mod 32) 10 Decryption: 10 - 15 – 30