The Stable Marriage Problem稳定婚姻问题.pptVIP

Steven Rudich: Lemma: No boy can be rejected by all the girls Proof by contradiction. Suppose boy b is rejected by all the girls. At that point: Each girl must have a suitor other than b(By Improvement Lemma, once a girl has a suitor she will always have at least one) The n girls have n suitors, b not among them. Thus, there are at least n+1 boys Contradiction Steven Rudich: Theorem: The TMA always terminates in at most n2 days A “master list” of all n of the boys lists starts with a total of n X n = n2 girls on it. Each day that at least one boy gets a “No”, at least one girl gets crossed off the master list Therefore, the number of days is bounded by the original size of the master list In fact, since each list never drops below 1, the number of days is bounded by n(n-1) = n2. Steven Rudich: Corollary: Each girl will marry her absolute favorite of the boys who visit her during the TMA Steven Rudich: Great! We know that TMA will terminate and produce a pairing.But is it stable? Steven Rudich: Theorem: Let T be the pairing produced by TMA. T is stable. g b g* Steven Rudich: Theorem: Let T be the pairing produced by TMA. T is stable. g b I rejected you when you came to my balcony, now I got someone better. g* Steven Rudich: Theorem: Let T be the pairing produced by TMA. T is stable. Let b and g be any couple in T. Suppose b prefers g* to g. We will argue that g* prefers her husband to b. During TMA, b proposed to g* before he proposed to g. Hence, at some point g* rejected b for someone she preferred. By the Improvement lemma, the person she married was also preferable to b. Thus, every boy will be rejected by any girl he prefers to his wife. T is stable. Steven Rudich: Opinion Poll Who is better off in traditional dating, the boys or the girls? Steven Rudich: Forget TMA for a moment How should we define what we mean when we say “the optimal girl for boy b”? Flawed Attempt: “The girl at the top of b’s list” Steven Rudich: The Optimal Gi