Virtue in Virtue Ethics.pdf

Virtue in Virtue Ethics Joel J. Kupperman Published online: 23 June 2009
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract This paper represents two polemics. One is against suggestions (made by Harman and others) that recent psychological research counts against any claim that there is such a thing as genuine virtue (Cf. Harman, in: Byrne, Stalnaker, Wedgwood (eds.) Fact and value, pp 117–127, 2001). The other is against the view that virtue ethics should be seen as competing against such theories as Kantian ethics or consequentialism, particularly in the specification of decision procedures. Keywords Character
Lapse
Psychological
Situation
Traits
Virtue 1 Virtue Let us begin with three obvious truths, and a couple that are less obvious. Obvious truth 1: No one is perfect. Everyone will, in some imaginable circumstances, behave in a morally inadequate way. For any X there is a situation S such that X in S is liable to behave badly. Obvious truth 2: People do not always behave in the same (‘‘consistent’’) way. They sometimes act out of character.1 Further, character is rarely static. It can develop or be modified though a lifetime. J. J. Kupperman () University of Connecticut, 344 Mansfield Road, U-2054, Stors, CT 06269-2054, USA e-mail: joel.kupperman@uconn.edu 1 When people do act out of character, can we subject the actions to moral judgment? Hume (1978) insists that ‘‘if any action be either virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend on durable principles of the mind… Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never consider’d in morality’’ (Hume 1978, Book III, Part III, Section I, p. 575). What Hume says might seem plausible in relation to minor lapses—we often do forgive or ‘‘write off’’ minor lapses that are out of character—but at 123 J Ethics (2009) 13:243–255 DOI 10.1007/s10892-009-9051-5 Obvious truth 3