我国上市银行高管薪酬与公司绩效的相关性研究-文献综述修改版.docVIP

摘要 商业银行经营绩效与高管薪酬的关系一直是学界研究的热点问题之一。我国商业银行存在着“以短期激励为主，长期激励不足”的现象，长期激励严重缺失导致股权激励不够，但股权激励才是薪酬激励的关键。如何建立良好的薪酬激励制度来激励管理者为企业所有者带来效益最大化具有重要意义。 根据我们所查阅的文献期刊的实证研究表明，由于多种因素共同影响，国有控股商业银行高管薪酬与经营绩效呈不显著相关现象，非国有控股商业银行高管薪酬与经营绩效呈负相关现象。本文运用激励理论对我国上市商业银行高管薪酬的现状进行分析，并从公司治理角度出发提出我国商业银行高管薪酬体系中存在的问题。之后，按照国有控股和非国有控股划分，分别选取具有代表性的案例中国银行、工商银行和浦发银行、民生银行进行比较研究，综合分析得出高管薪酬体系中存在的问题。 最后，基于研究结果，本文从银行自身普遍存在的问题出发，为优化银行业高管薪酬体系提出建议。  Abstract Commercial Banks operating performance and the relationship between executive pay has been one of the hot issues of academic research. Our country commercial bank exists insufficient is given priority to with short-term incentive, long-term incentive, long-term incentive deficiency leads to lack of equity incentive , but the equity incentive is the key to the salary incentive. How to establish a good salary incentive system to motivate managers bring to business owners is of great significance to maximize profits. According to what we refer to the literature periodical empirical studies show that because of the influence of various factors, the state-owned commercial bank executive pay and not significantly correlated to the business performance, non-state-owned holding commercial bank executive pay and negatively correlated with business performance. In this paper, we use the incentive theory to analyzing the present situation and problems of executive compensation of listed commercial Banks in China, and put forward our country commercial bank from the perspective of corporate governance problems that exist in the executive compensation system. , in accordance with the state-owned and non-state-owned holding, respectively select the typical case of the bank of China, industrial and commercial bank and Shanghai pudong development bank, minsheng bank, a comparative study, synthetically analyzing the problems existing in the executive compensation system. Finally, based on the results of the study, in this paper, we set off the problems of the Banks themselves, in