考虑声誉的公私合作项目监管演化博弈分析.PDF

第32 卷第2 期 系统工 程 学 报 Vol.32 No.2 2017 年4 月 JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING Apr. 2017 考虑声誉的公私合作项目监管演化博弈分析 李小莉 (暨南大学管理学院, 广东广州510632) 摘要: 为探析声誉对公私合作(PPP)项目监管的影响, 构建了演化博弈模型, 分析了声誉对私人部门及政府监管部门 行为的影响. 结果显示, 在未考虑声誉的情形下, 当政府监管部门的监管收益不足以弥补监管成本时, 由于受到私人 部门寻租行为及对私人部门的惩罚不足的影响, 系统最终可能演化为私人部门选择提供低质量公共产品/服务的稳 定状态; 在考虑声誉的情形下, 当声誉转化水平达到一定程度时, 可以有效促进私人部门自觉提供高质量的公共产 品/服务. 研究结果表明, 政府在制定相应监管与惩罚机制的基础上, 还应建立合理的声誉机制以激励私人部门不断 提高公共产品/服务的质量. 关键词: 演化博弈; 声誉; 公私合作; 项目监管 中图分类号: F224 文献标识码: A 文章编号:2017 doi: 10.13383/ki.jse.2017.02.006 Evolution game analysis of public-private partnership projects regulatory with consideration of reputation Li Xiaoli (School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China) Abstract: In order to analyze the impact of reputation on regulatory of public-private partnership projects, the effects of reputation on the behaviors of private sectors and government regulators are analyzed by establishing an evolution game model. The results show that, without considering the reputation and when the regulatory incomes of government regulator are not sufficient to cover costs, it may eventually evolve into a stable state of the private sector providing low quality public products/services as a result of rent-seeking behaviors and insufficient punishments for the private sector. When reputation is considered and its transformation reaches a certain level, the consciousness of the private sector to provide high quality public goods/services can be effectively promoted. Therefore, besides establishing appropriate regulation and penalty mecha