达龙阿西莫格鲁-制度、政治经济学和增长.pdf

Institutions, Political Economy and Growth Daron Acemoglu MIT (Building on long-term collaboration with James A. Robinson) MIT September 4, 2012. Acemoglu (MIT) Institutions, Political Economy and Growth September 4, 2012. 1 / 43 Institutions, Political Economy and Growth Introduction Introduction: From Proximate to Fundamental Causes Huge cross-country di§erences in income per capita. Largely due to signiÖcant di§erences in growth over the last 200 years. Empirical work in economic growth has successfully decomposed these di§erences in levels and growth rates into contributions from physical capital, human capital and residual (technology). But why do these factors vary so much across countries? Some possible fundamental causes: 1 Geography 2 Institutions 3 Culture 4 Luck Acemoglu (MIT) Institutions, Political Economy and Growth September 4, 2012. 2 / 43 Institutions, Political Economy and Growth Institutions What Are Institutions? ìInstitutions are the rules of the game in a society,..., the humanly devised constraints that shape human interactionî Douglass North Key points: institutions are (1) are humanly devised; (2) set constraints; (3) shape incentives. But important that institutions have to be broadly construedó economic, political and social; de facto and de jure. But crucially, institutions are all about politics, because di§erent sets of institutions lead to di§erent distributions of resources. Thus the investigation of the institutional origins of prosperity is largely about the politics of institutions: who has power to mold in