一种P2P网络的重复博弈激励机制.pdfVIP

Computer Engineering and Applications 计算机工程与应用 2010 ，46 （35 ） 75 一种P2P 网络的重复博弈激励机制 1 2 3 刘 浩 ，卿 桐 ，张连明 1 2 3 LIU Hao ，QING Tong ，ZHANG Lian-ming 1.湖南人文科技学院 计算机科学技术系，湖南 娄底 417000 2.湖南城市学院 计算机科学技术系，湖南 益阳 413000 3.华南理工大学 计算机科学与工程系，广州 510640 1.Hunan Institute of Humanities ，Science and Technology ，Loudi ，Hunan 417000 ，China 2.Department of Computer Science ，Hunan City University ，Yiyang ，Hunan 413000 ，China 3.School of Computer Science Engineering ，South China University of Technology ，Guangzhou 510640 ，China E-mail ：lhkd0407@ 126.com LIU Hao ，QING Tong ，ZHANG Lian-ming.Incentive mechanisms for P2P network based on repeated game.Computer Engineering and Applications ，2010 ，46 （35 ）：75-77. Abstract ：The selfishness of nodes degrades the system usability of P2P network.The corresponding solutions to this prob- lem could be establishing effective mechanisms of incentive.The features of P2P network is taken into account ，an incentive model for P2P network is proposed in this paper ，which comes from matching game.This paper also implements the finite state machine of the incentive model.Punishing mechanisms to selfish peers and some essential norms are introduced in this model ，which stimulates rational peers to maximize their own utility and contribute their free resource.Analysis and simula- tion results testify that this model can effectively punish selfish peers ，and make them drop selfish behaviors. Key words ：P2P network ；matching game ；finite state machine ；incentive mechanisms 摘 要：P2P 网络中节点的自私行为极大地降低了系统的可用性，相应解决方案是建立有效的激励机制。在借鉴博弈理论的基础 上，并结合P2P 网络的特点，提出了一种基于重复博弈的激励机制，构建了该模型的有限状态自动机。该模型通过引入对自私节 点的惩罚机制，同时制定相关的行为规则，来激励理性节点为使其自身收益最大化而向整个网络贡献资源。仿真结果与分析表 明该模型能有效地惩罚自私节点，威慑其放弃自私行为。 关键词：P2P 网络；博弈；有限自动机；激励机制 DOI ：10.3778/j.issn. 1002-8331.2010.35.022 文章编号：1002-8331（2010 ）35-0075-03 文献标识码：Ａ 中图分类号：TP393 在过去的几年中P2P 网络已经横扫了整个世界，数不胜数