国企公司治理与混合所有制改革的逻辑和路径_郑志刚.pdfVIP

市场动态 国企公司治理与混合所有制改革的逻辑和路径 郑志刚 (中国人民大学财政金融学院/中国财政金融政策研究中心，北京 100872) 摘要：2015年我国国企将掀起混合所有制改革的大幕。国企公司治理的现状是：部分国企凭籍市场的垄断地位获取高额利 润，形成与民企的不公平竞争，面临公众对国资垄断经营和不公平竞争的不满和愤怒；目前政府除了通过国有资产管理链 条“管资本”外，还通过至上而下的人事任免体系和国企官员晋升考核事实上对企业经营产生实质性影响，国企成为存在 代理冲突的“新古典资本主义企业”；由于产生来源、更迭机制中经理人权力的影响和董事会任人唯亲文化的存在，独立 董事并没有发挥预期的监督经理人的作用。因而，以混合所有制改革为特征的新一轮国企改革事实上遵循的历史逻辑是： 平抑公众对国资垄断经营和不公平竞争的不满和愤怒；实现国有资产保值增值目的；国企改制“资本社会化”传统逻辑的 延续；旨在通过引入其他性质的股份，提高国有资本的运行效率；体现国有资产管理理念的革新——从经营企业到经营资 本。而混合所有制改革一个可能的实现路径是，国有资本通过持有(附加一定条件同时达到一定比例的)优先股来向民间资 本做出排除隧道挖掘，直接干预和经营企业的庄重承诺，以此更好地实现国有资产的增值和保值目的。 关键词：国企改革；公司治理；混合所有制改革 Abstract: The reform of mixed ownership for the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will be launched in 2015. There are several characteristics of SOEs’ corporate governance as follows: some SOEs gain high profit by virtue of their market powers of monopoly, which impairs fair competition with private enterprises and stirs the wrath from the public; the government not only controls SOEs though the administration system of state-owned asset but also exerts significant influence on the management of SOE through executive personnel appointments, especially the executives’ political promotion, which makes the SOEs become “neo-classical capitalist enterprises” with serious agency conflicts; independent directors cannot play their supervision role as expected since both their recruiting and turnover are affected by the managerial power and the board culture of cronyism. Thereforethe historic logic behind the SOEs reform is allaying the wrath from the public, value preservation and appreciation of state-owned asset, SOEs’ capital further socialization, improvement of operating efficiencies though introduction of pirate shares and the administration system innovation of state-owned asset from controlling the firms to the capital. Based on the revi