建设工程评标委托代理关系的博弈分析.pdfVIP

第 39 卷第 3 期 河南大学学报(自然科学版〉 Vo l. 39 No.3 2009 年 5 月 Journal of Henan University (Natural Science) May 2009 建设工程评标委托代理关系的博弈分析 舒美英，蔡建国，范义荣 {浙江林学院园林学院，浙江临安 311300) 摘 要:运用博弈论中的委托代理理论对建设工程评标专家的激励约束 IC 与参与约束 IR 进行了研究.从信息对 称和信息不对称两个角度分析f评标专家的努力水平、实际收入和业主的期望收入z 从 IC 和 IR 均成立、IR 不成 立、IC 不成立、IC 和 IR 均不成也冈方面分析了评标专家的努力工作水平、努力工作成本系数、风险规避度、产出方 差和业主收益.分析表明，委托代理关系中的 IC 和 IR 相比.IC 更为重要，业主要想提高评标效果，就必须采取相 应的措施，激励评标专家努力工作，抑制道德风险的发生. 关键词:评标;委托代理s 博弈;道德风险 中图分类号:TU723.2 文献标志码:A 文章编号: 1003-4978(2009)03-0323一04 Game Analysis of Principal-Agent Relation in Evaluating Bids of Construction Project SHU Mei-ying. CAI Jian-guo. FAN Yi-rong (lnstitute of 也rdens， Zhejiang Institute of Forestry , Zhejiang Lin an 311300 , China) Abstract: According to the game theory. the incentive compatibility constraint (lC) and the participation constraint IR) in principal-agent relationship between the bid inviting party and bid evaluation committee were analyzed. The bid evaluation committee 5 hard work and real income. the bid inviting party anticipant income were analyzed under symmetric and asymmetric information. Being absent of IC and IR conditional expression. the bìd evaluation commìtteés work hard. work cost. measure of risk aversion. output variance and the bid inviting party income were discussed under IC and IR existence. IR inexistence. IC inexistence. IC and IR inexistence. IC was more important than IR. If the bid inviting party wants to improve the bid evaluation efficience. it must adopt incentive mechanisms which can make the bid evaluati