社会危害评价的博弈分析.pdfVIP

m 回 a 阳 总 院 学 业 职 宵 究 · 州研 治 法 安 公贵 踵 F 社会危害评价的懵弈分析 唐正祥(西南政法大学，重庆558侧) 摘 要:犯罪的社会危害评价始终是刑事政策、刑法立法、刑事司法关注的焦点。 博鼻模型的展开及模拟 运行结论，描述了人们在刑法制度环珑下如何评价行为的社会危害以及导致的结果，可以为社会危害评价 提供新的思维模式和经济学上的支持。 在被害人及其亲属与犯lJ人的完全信息静态博弃中，博弈的均衡是 认罪、谅解; 在中止犯的完全信息动态博弈中，最优均衡是中止、减免。 关键词: 刑法;社会怠害评价;博弈 Game-th四retic Analysis of the EvaluatiOD OD Social Hannfuln倒 TANGZheng-骂iang (Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 558创泊， China) Abstract: Evaluation on the social hannfulness of crime has always been the focus of criminal policy , criminal legislation and criminal justice. The application of the game-theoretic model and the conclusion reached through simulative running of the g创ne theory has described how people evaluate the social harmfulness of an act and the consequence in the institutional environment of criminal law, and therefore providing a new mode of thinking and economic support for the evaluation on s()cial harmfulness. In the static game of complete information between the victim (including the far旧Uω) with the crirninal, the balanced state is confession and forgiveness; In the dynamic game of complete information involving discontinued crimes, the optimal equilibrium is to discontinue the crime and mitigate the punishment. Key words: criminallaw; evaluation on s∞ial hannfulness; garne {中图分类号: D924.1 文献标识码:A 文章编号: 1671-5195 (2016) 03-∞15-08) DOI:10.