跨行政区流域水污染治理基于政策博弈的分析.pdfVIP

《生态经济》第32卷第9期 (2016年9月 ) Ecological Economy , Vo l. 32, No. 9 (September 2016) 跨行政区流域水污染治理:基于政策搏弈的分析 李胜 (江西财经大学财税与公共管理学院，江西南昌 330013) 摘要:跨行政区流域水污染政策博弈模型表明:地方政府对环保部门的环境执法有重要影响，在区域利益冲突、信 息不对称和缺乏激励机制的情况下，地方政府很难真正执行中央政府的治理政策:如果中央政府加大对地方政府的 问责力度，可能使地方政府面临巨大的经济发展压力而不得不对本行政区的污染进行治理。为实现跨行政区流域水 污染的良好治理，有必要对条块分割的环境管理体制进行调整，改变地方政府的利益偏好，通过采取承诺行动提高 中央政府的政策效率和直信度，建立跨行政区流域水污染协同治理机制实现流域生态质量改善的政策目标。 关键词=跨行政区:流域:水污染:政策博弈 中图分类号: F062.2 文献标识码:A 文章编号: 1671-4407(2016)09-173-04 Trans-District Water Pollution Control: A Research ßased on Policy Game LI Sheng (School ofFinance and Public Administration , Jiangxi University ofFinance and Economics , Nanchang Jiangxi 3300日， China) Abstract: The policy game model of trans-district water pollution control analysis shows that local govemments have important implications for environmental law enforcement in the region of conflict of interest, information asymmetry and lack of incentives , local govemments are difficult to implement central gove口rment control policies; but if the central gove口rment increased accountability or implementation regional res往ictions policy, local govemments wiU face enormous economic pressure and have to control the pollution. In order to achieve good govemance of basin water pollution , it is necessary to adjust the 企agmentation of environmental management system, to change the interest s preference of local govemment, take committed action to improve the efficiency and confidence of central govemment policy, and establish collaborative governance mechanisms to achieve the improvement of ecological qualitys policy objectives. Key words: trans-district; basin; water pollution; policy game 环境污染是当今世界各国，尤其是发展中国家普遍面