在非完善政府竞争下的公共品的最优供给.pdf

Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive – POLIS Department of Public Policy and Public Choice – POLIS Working paper n. 50 April 2005 Optimal provision of public goods under imperfect intergovernmental competition Ferruccio Ponzano UNIVERSITA’ DEL PIEMONTE ORIENTALE “Amedeo Avogadro” ALESSANDRIA Optimal provision of public goods under imperfect intergovernmental competition by Ferruccio Ponzano Department of Public Policy and Public Choice – Polis University of Eastern Piedmont “Amedeo Avogadro” Via Cavour 84 – 15100 Alessandria – Italy Phone: +39 0131 283715 Fax: +39 0131 283704 E-mail: ferruccio.ponzano@sp.unipmn.it Abstract: The aim of this paper is to develop a model that includes two tiers of government providing public goods with the same tax base to finance them. Their rent is related to the level of competition. Citizens maximize their own utility starting from these different levels of competition. Therefore, they can decide to turn down the governments to induce them to behave efficiently. Moreover, governments can choose whether to accept the behaviour urged by citizens or to maximize their rent for a single period of office and consequently lose the next elections. JEL classification: H11, H21, H71, H77. 2 1. Introduction The choice among private goods and public g